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Abstract
Background: Public district hospitals (PDHs) in Tunisia are not operating at full plant capacity and underutilize 
their operating budget.
Methods: Individual PDHs capacity utilization (CU) is measured for 2000 and 2010 using dual data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) approach with shadow prices input and output restrictions. The CU is estimated for 101 of 105 PDH 
in 2000 and 94 of 105 PDH in 2010. 
Results: In average, unused capacity is estimated at 18% in 2010 vs. 13% in 2000. Of PDHs 26% underutilize their 
operating budget in 2010 vs. 21% in 2000. 
Conclusion: Inadequate supply, health quality and the lack of operating budget should be tackled to reduce unmet 
user’s needs and the bypassing of the PDHs and, thus to increase their CU. Social health insurance should be turned 
into a direct purchaser of curative and preventive care for the PDHs. 
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Implications for policy makers
• The underutilized hospital’s capacity is detrimental to good practice in spending and should be regularly measured, analyzed, and prevented.
• The inadequate supply due to the lack of operating budget, of specialized physicians, of bed’s flexibility and of health quality should be tackled 
to reduce unmet user’s needs and the bypassing of the Public district hospitals (PDHs) and, thus to increase their capacity utilization (CU).
• Social health insurance should be turned into a direct purchaser of curative care from the PDH as well as for a package of preventive services. 
In line, many PDHs may be transformed into regional hospitals.
Implications for the public
Government efforts in reducing the unused capacity utilization (CU) and in improving the management of district hospitals could increase the 
patient use of primary healthcare services and reduce the bypassing of these facilities. Public district hospitals (PDHs) should constitute an effective 
continuum of both preventive and curative services and facilitate smoother functioning of primary healthcare centers.
Key Messages 
Background
Tunisian health sector reform was officially started in the 
mid-1990s aiming at improvement of health quality, social 
health protection and the performance of the health system. 
The health system is predominantly public as 85% of all beds 
belong to public hospitals. The medical doctor’s density is 
inequitably distributed and is lower in poorer areas, where 
most beneficiaries are covered by the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) through free medical assistance. The main steward 
is the MoH although its oversight of the private sector is 
currently limited.
The public hospitals are relatively well-distributed 
geographically in terms of physical facilities but remains 
facing challenges in terms of quality, access and performance. 
It is organized in three levels: primary level including 2104 
primary healthcare centers and 105 Public district hospitals 
(PDHs), secondary level including 32 regional hospitals 
to which urban PHC facilities are linked and a third tier 
composed from 22 university hospitals, which are mainly 
located in large urban cities. Public hospitals consume 51% 
the total current health expenditure and 90% of public health 
funding, of which 22% is dedicated to PDH. Hospital budgets 
are composed of state subsidies from the annual budget, 
reimbursement through billing system for patients covered 
by social health insurance (only for regional and university 
hospitals) and by user-fee revenue. Capital investments and 
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In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate bout the role of power in glob l hea th, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
gener ted by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” O ms is submit ing to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the utcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of p litics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response i  to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective ide tification. But 
the fixation of so ial relations is partial and precarious, s nce
antagonism is an ev r present possibility. To p liticize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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 a rece t c tri ti  t  t e g i g e ate a t t e 
r le f er i  gl l ealt , rik s e asizes 
t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
e i e tifies t ree relate  r le s: (1) a lack f agree e t 
a g gl al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re ises, 
(2) a lack f agree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a v cacy.1
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it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive  y crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cer s f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s it i g t  a li eral 
c ce ti  f litics e i licitly criticizes t e o tc es 
f.1  li eral vie  f olitics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts a  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec ic 
calc lati , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
is ec e  i  s e  e states t at “it is t ssi le t  
isc ss t e litics f gl al ealt  it t isc ssi g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at e ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
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pay roll staffing are MoH’s responsibility while operating costs 
are covered under a prospective line-item. In this context, 
incentives for hospitals to operate efficiently are generally 
weak.
During the last two decades, Tunisia has implemented 
reforms of the health sector and of the social health insurance. 
The financing and managerial autonomy has been increased, 
more specifically for university and regional public hospitals.1 
Teaching hospitals have been given varying degrees of semi-
autonomy within the public sector and empowered to make 
key strategic, financial, and clinical decisions themselves. 
The social health insurance reform has been ongoing into 
two main objectives. The first is devoted to increase access 
for both public and private health facilities while the second 
is dedicated to improve finance and performance of the 
health system. Social health protection is being provided by 
the National Health Insurance fund and medical assistance 
schemes for poor and vulnerable.1 Nevertheless, Tunisia’s 
health system continues facing huge challenges. Healthcare 
resources are unequally distributed across the country. The 
country lacks an effective primary care system, represented by 
basic healthcare centers and district hospitals.
Actually, public hospitals receive 33% of total current health 
expenditures and 55% of total outpatient and inpatient’s care in 
the country.2 The PDH are receiving meager resources (20%-
25% of the total MoH funding3,4) with a lack of clear strategic 
planning and management. Despite the budget constraint, 
public hospitals are providing 80% of total inpatient’s care. 
In Tunisia, hospital capacity was evaluated using input-based 
indicators (bed occupancy, length of stay, etc) or inpatient 
days and number of beds. The bed occupancy rate (BOR) is 
a measure of utilization of the available beds, more precisely 
the percentage of occupied beds. The PDH experienced 
low BORs. BORs fluctuated around 25%-38% during a long 
period, low compared to teaching hospitals (75%-80%), 
regional hospitals (50%-55%)3,5 and to conventional accepted 
levels (80%-85%). 
PDH experienced higher excess capacity to satisfy uncertain 
demand and consequently higher costs. Excess capacity can 
be explained by the low rate of the bed occupation that has 
never been more than 38% and in average 34% in 2000 and 
25% in 2013. These hospitals seem treating more outpatient’s 
people rather than being admitted to these hospitals. There is 
also very little price competition and little incentive to contain 
costs and ensure efficiency and plant capacity utilization 
(CU). 
Excess capacity is due to many factors like the inadequate 
healthcare supply, the lack of budget and the shortage of 
human resources, particularly specialized physicians and to 
the uncertain nature of healthcare demand.6 PDH are managed 
at central MoH level in recruitment, procuring of supplies and 
capital investment decisions. PDH are historically struggling 
with the lack of internal strategic planning and management 
for an effective primary healthcare delivery. PDH offer 
healthcare services not in line with clinical requirements 
of non-communicable diseases and longterm treatment 
whereof it does not meet the needs of large proportion of the 
population. 
There is a huge gap on individual public health facility 
performance due to the lack of research evidence, particularly 
on efficiency and CU. Inefficiency and low rates of CU 
weaken the health system’s effectiveness and waste resources. 
This study develops an economic framework for analyzing 
the plant CU and optimal input usage on the short term for 
PDH s using an extended data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
model. It seeks to examine the CU for a sample of PDH 
between two years, 2000 and 2010, with a view to assess the 
regional distribution. It will generate evidence for managers 
and planners in resource allocation decisions.
The economic and engineering concept of CU according to 
Johansen7 is preferred in the context of multiproduct hospitals. 
In empirical literature, a range of methods for measuring 
CU has been developed. The prominent are nonparametric 
frontier analysis based on linear program DEA8-10 approaches 
for CU estimates.11-15 The CU is estimated from data on 
observed inputs and outputs. Many times the concept of 
capacity is closely related to the technological characteristics 
of the production process. For this reason, DEA has the great 
advantage that it does not require any a priori specification 
about a particular functional form and this ensures the 
sufficient flexibility to adapt to the specific characteristics of 
the observed production unit.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The background 
was discussed in this first section. The theoretical model 
(methods) and data are discussed in the second section. 
The results of the analyses are presented in the third section. 
The last section includes a discussion of results and the 
conclusions. 
Methods
Theoretical Model and Estimation
Theoretical foundation of CU is provided by Johansen7 and 
Morrison.14 Johansen referred to the production function and 
defined single output capacity technology as: “Production 
capacity is defined as the maximum that can be produced by 
a production unit with fixed and variable inputs for a given 
period and provided that the availability of variable factors of 
production is not restricted.”
Nelson16 and Morrison14 provide the economic definition of 
capacity, where the optimal output measure is the tangency 
between the short-run and long-run average cost curve. 
Many Studies12,13,15,17 have focused on Johansen’s definition 
assessing individual hospitals CU. CU corresponds to output 
produced, given full and efficient variable input utilization 
and capacity base constraints imposed by ie, fixed factors, 
technology, environmental conditions, and resource stock. 
Frontier setting preference using distance function18 with the 
DEA approach10,13 as key method is reasoned as DEA does not 
require input price information and can incorporate multiple 
outputs. DEA is based on Koopmans19 and Farrell20 (economic 
axioms). Arrow and Debreu21 provides the production 
technology and frontier enabling the scores estimation of 
efficiency and CU. In frontier setting, the CU scores can be 
estimated using the distance function10,12 or the directional 
distance function.22,23
Färe12,13,15 has developed a primal DEA model estimating 
CU from output-oriented efficiency scores. DEA constructs 
a ‘‘best practice frontier’’ for maximum possible outputs for 
fixed input quantities. DEA has been extended examining 
sufficient capacity among hospitals and their CU. Following 
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Färe,11 we adopt Johansen’s definition of plant CU: ‘‘The 
maximal amount that can be produced per unit of time with 
existing plant and equipment without restrictions on the 
availability of variable production factors.’’8
To estimate individual PDH CU, we formulate a dual DEA 
model including additional constraints on input and output 
shadow prices. Shadow price restrictions enrich the empirical 
CU measure by adding priorities in terms of input and output 
costs which have a significant economic meaning. It is well-
known that DEA models are very flexible in the sense that they 
evaluate an observation in its best possible light. Therefore, no 
a priori ordering is made among the shadow prices of inputs 
or outputs and all positive shadow prices are allowed for the 
different inputs and outputs. However, in order to maximize 
the efficiency of the evaluated observation, extreme shadows 
prices can be selected by the linear program which can be 
counterintuitive from an economic point of view. We can limit 
this extreme flexibility of DEA models by constraining the 
ordering of shadows prices. While not knowing the ‘real’ or 
‘market’ prices of each input and output, we can nevertheless 
order theses prices and impose the same order to the shadow 
prices. The objective can be thought of as adding an economic 
meaning into the linear program of DEA. 
Summarizing, CU scores are obtained in three steps 
determining (a) the maximum output obtainable from 
observed (fixed and variable) inputs; (b) the maximum 
amount of output obtained from observed fixed inputs alone 
assuming unconstrained variable inputs; and (c) take the ratio 
of the first two steps to obtain a CU measure.9 Steps (a) and 
(b) require a series of the linear programming steps. 
Assuming identical hospital production technology, the 
production technology set (P(x)) transforms a vector N 
inputs ( 1( ,...., ) NNx x R+= ∈x ) into a vector of M outputs 
( 1( ,...., )
M
My y R+= ∈y ). Applying basic economic axioms,24 
the production set { }( )  can produce P x y x y= provides a 
convex and freely disposable input and output technology. 
Technical efficiency and CU ratio (CUR) of observed input 
and output (x, y) vectors are derived from the production 
technology P(x). Output-oriented efficiency scores are 
estimated by the following output distance function:
{ }( , ) inf 0 : ( / ) ( )oD x y y P x
θ
θ θ= > ∈                                         (1)
DEA programs estimate the distance function and CURs.8,9 
Färe11,12 derived CU in a frontier setting using distance 
function while Ferrier23 employs the directional distance 
function to aggregate capacities of individual hospitals into 
a group.
We formulate a dual DEA program with shadow prices 
constraints using the output distance. For each hospital, the 
dual DEA estimates CU using individual hospital observed 
inputs and outputs according to Johansen’s definition. In 
the short-run, inputs need to be categorized as fixed (xf) 
and variable (xv); that is, x = (xf, xv) for each hospital k. 
We define Nf fixed inputs and Nv variable inputs such that 
Nf+Nv = N. The fixed inputs sub-vector (xf) refers to the 
existing plant and equipment. The activity vector Z is a weight 
assigned to the observed kth hospital in the linear convex 
technology combination. Suppose K (k = 1,…, K) hospitals 
in the data sample. Under variable returns to scale and strong 
disposability, the production set P(x) with fixed and variable 
inputs is: 
1 1
1 1
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Output-oriented efficiency can be provided by the output 
distance function giving radial proportion scaled-up hospital 
output projections on the frontier.11,12 The value of the output 
distance function for the ith hospital is calculated using dual 
linear programming. 
From a practical point of view, the above radial efficiency 
measure Do (xf, xv, y) is computed relative to the previously 
defined reference technology P(x) by solving a linear program 
for each observation. This yields a primal DEA linear program. 
The dual DEA program is derived with shadow price 
constraints estimating the distance function Do (x
f, xv, y). 
The value of the output distance function for the kth hospital 
is found by solving the following dual linear programming 
input and output shadow prices constraints problem (3). 
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Fixed factor shadow prices restrictions impose an input values 
ordering. Fixed inputs are the number of medical doctors, 
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surgical dentists, midwives, nurses, and beds in the empirical 
study. Assuming a higher shadow price of one physician 
compared to one surgical dentist, which is higher than the 
one of a midwife which is higher than the one of a nurse. The 
shadow price of a bed (proxy of capital) is assumed higher 
than those of all other inputs. Following the same line of 
thought, a shadow prices ordering is imposed among outputs 
(admissions, admissions in maternity wards, outpatient 
visits in stomatology, in emergency and in external wards). 
Admissions are higher valued than outpatient visits. These are 
expected relationships in the real world. It avoids DEA models 
to choose inappropriate shadow prices for the evaluated 
hospitals. That is why it is so important to complement DEA 
models with sound exogenous economic information.
The second step in measuring the CUR is to determine 
each hospital’s capacity with constant fixed inputs, allowing 
variable inputs to be unrestricted (consistent with Johansen’s 
definition of capacity). Hospital k’s capacity is given by the 
following linear programming solution (4):
1
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The only difference between the equations (3) and (4) is the 
treatment of variable inputs. In equation (3) hospital variable 
inputs are restricted to currently available levels; in equation 
(4) variable inputs are unrestricted and not constrained. It is 
assumed that a hospital has access to as many variable inputs 
as needed for full capacity. Variable inputs can be omitted 
from the specification. 1 ( , , )f vo k k kD y x x
−  and 1 ( , )fo k kD y x
−  
are the inverse of Shephard distance function18 and can be 
interpreted as Farrell’s efficiency measure.22 They represent 
the possible radial increase in outputs if hospital (k) operates 
efficiently. The last step in the CUR process is taking the ratio 
of the inverse of solutions given by equations (3) and (4) to 
determine hospital k’s CUR: 
  ( , )
( , , )
( , , )
f
o kf v k
k kk f v
o k kk
D y x
CUR y x x
D y x x
=                                                                         (5)
This measure is devoid of any technical inefficiency since 
the latter appears in the numerator and denominator. 
(1 ( , , ))f vk kkCUR y x x−  can be interpreted as the percentage 
of additional output to be produced at full capacity without 
variable input restrictions. Obviously, given the property of 
the output distance function necessarily:
0 ( , , ) 1f vk kkCUR y x x< ≤
Using CUR has several advantages. First, by taking the ratio 
of the output distance functions any technical inefficiency 
is removed by definition. This means the measure is not 
downward biased, in contrast to most traditional CU measures. 
Second, capacity measures are computed at the frontier and 
defined relative to observed best practices. Third, it is able to 
accommodate a multiplicity of inputs and outputs. Input and 
output data describe the hospital’s production technology 
without the use of functional forms. The advantage of 
using a non-parametric approach - not requiring an explicit 
representation of the form of the technology - is that it 
envelopes the observed input and output data by forming 
facets around the frontier of the observed data. This type of 
modeling has been used extensively in hospital studies as well 
as in health economics more generally (see Hollingsworth25,26 
for a review of efficiency measurement and Ferrier23 and 
Färe11 for the applied nonparametric measure of CU for 
health facilities).
Data
Public hospitals in Tunisia are regionally-based of PDH as 
a first reference level receiving patients that go beyond the 
primary healthcare centers. These hospitals regulate access 
to referral regional and university hospitals with a mission 
to provide healthcare services for the whole territory. They 
consume a high proportion of the overall MoH budget (25% 
in the 2013 budget year). In addition, these hospitals account 
for about 66% of total public hospitals. 
PDH were created the decade following the independence 
in 1956. It focused on building health infrastructure, when 
medical treatment uses less specialized technology for high 
prevalence of communicable diseases. More PDH were 
created in the 1980s to support primary healthcare, especially 
maternal and child health. Their mission as defined by the 
sanitary law 1991 was limited to provide ambulatory and 
emergency care, maternal and child care and short day’s 
hospitalizations. PDH offer many healthcare services such 
as outpatient, inpatient and emergency of internal medicine, 
surgery, as well as pediatric, dental, and maternity care. 
Outpatient and inpatient care are the first services delivered 
while the second set essentially consists of emergency. 
Medical consultations of the PDH represent more than 40% 
of total medical visits of all public health facilities. Overall, the 
volume of medical services increases over the period. 
The size of the PDH is relatively small with on average of 
38 beds and 16 physicians. Large disparities can be detected 
by the variation in the number of beds ranging from 20 to 
128 and in the number of physician ranging from 8 to 26 
(Table 1), Overall, the size of PDH, as measured by human 
and physical resources, increased over the study period. 
Indeed, of the 166 of total public’s hospitals in the country, 
105 are PDH with 15% of total public beds in 2010 vs. 12% 
in 2000.2,3 PDH are managed and subsidized MoH. One of 
the most striking observations is that social health insurance 
contributes indirectly to the finance of PDH; contrary to the 
billing system implemented for the regional and university 
hospitals.
Relevant data of the PDH is limited in Tunisia. In this study, 
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data was collected from various MoH reports for 20102 and 
from a survey for 2000.27 The CU is estimated for 101 of 105 
PDH in 2000 and 94 of 105 PDH in 2010. 
Inputs and outputs were selected according to the literature 
on nonparametric DEA-based measurement of hospital 
efficiency.25,26,28,29 PDH production technology was 
represented by five fixed inputs, one variable input and 
five outputs, common to all hospitals. The input variables 
are broadly classified into labor, capital and technological 
input. The input variable of ‘staff ’ consists of total staff of a 
particular hospital. The break-down of the total staff in terms 
of the number of doctors, number of surgical dentist, number 
of midwives and number of nurses was available. 
Two measures of the capital input were used, one based on the 
number of beds per hospital as proxy for net capital assets (see 
Färe11) and one being the operating budget. The operating 
budget includes expenditure on drugs, maintenance of 
medical equipment, machinery, vehicles, infrastructure, etc 
as a proxy of the quantity of capital investment. 
In general, hospitals provide three major services: outpatient, 
inpatient, and laboratory services. Ideally, health output 
should be measured as an increment to patient health status as 
final products of hospitals. However, since this is technically 
impossible to measure, in all hospital CU and efficiency 
studies intermediate outputs of various kinds are used instead. 
Outputs disaggregated into inpatient and outpatient output 
is used in many studies.30,31 Given the complex definition of 
hospital output due to limited data availability in PDH, the 
number of cases treated in outpatient and inpatient services 
handled in five categories was chosen as a representative 
measure of the hospital’s output, since these were assumed 
to have significant implications for the use of resources. The 
selected outputs are services that supposedly improve health 
status. Descriptive statistics of input and output variables are 
provided in Table 1.
The availability of data on various indicators in the PDH 
was limited in Tunisia and, due to this constraint, we had to 
restrict our analysis to the above-mentioned input and output 
variables. Even we could not get data for the selected variables 
for 4 PDH in 2000 and for 11 in 2010; therefore, we could only 
include the remaining PDH out of 105 in our study. The data 
included in the study were reliable as we conducted checks 
and found that they were of good quality.
A DEA model for the measurement of CUR was run after 
feeding the input and output variables into program equation 
5. The CUR has economic relevance in the short term. The 
physical inputs are fixed (physicians, surgical dentists, 
midwives, nurses, and beds). Considering the operating budget 
as the only variable input, 1 minus CUR can be interpreted as 
the additional output if the budget were increased given the 
existing fixed inputs. In the short term, a low CUR is due to an 
insufficient budget. In the long run, the size (number of beds) 
and personnel categories can be considered as variable too.
Results 
Table 2 summarizes the CUR results for the two years 
according to the standard DEA (CURSDEA) and dual DEA 
model with shadow prices restrictions (CURPDEA). Overall, 
PDHs are not operating at full CU with respect to the two 
DEA models.
The average scores of CURSDEA decreased from 0.95 in 2000 to 
0.92 in 2010, indicating an excess capacity of 5% in 2000 and 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Input and Output Variables, 2000 and 2010
 
2000 2010
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Inputs
No. of physicians 7.62 3.83 6.00 22.00 16.01 2.82 8.00 26.00
No. of surgical dentist 1.11 0.62 0.00 3.00 4.20 1.20 0.00 9.00
No. of midwives 6.03 2.33 0.00 17.00 10.42 3.22 0.00 14.00
No. of nurses and equivalents 40.72 19.81 12.00 94.00 88.38 16.23 46.00 116.00
No. of beds 24.08 19.14 15.00 84.00 38.12 24.41 20.00 128.00
Operating budget 305.10 152.00 100.10 441.00 484.80 78.10 250.80 1260.00
Outputs
Outpatient visits in stomatology ward 3155.07 2056.21 0.00 11274.00 5626.83 18965.42 0.00 32145.00
Outpatient visits in emergency ward 10533.26 8221.50 0.00 43389.00 22134.51 9001.50 0.00 76250.00
Outpatient visits in external wards 27146.71 18809.64 0.00 108378.00 36445.12 14320.00 560.00 322446.00
No. of admissions 518.92 586.82 0.00 3191.00 1424.67 724.41 450.00 10320.00
No. admissions in maternity wards 441.82 309.21 0.00 1512.00 764.63 816.82 0.00 4316.00
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of CUR 2000-2010
  No. of PDH Mean SD Min Max
CUR
SDEA
2000 101 0.95 0.07 0.60 1.00
2010 94 0.92 0.11 0.66 1.00
CUR
PDEA
2000 101 0.87 0.15 0.22 1.00
2010 94 0.82 0.13 0.41 1.00
Wilcoxon Test
CUR
SDEA
 vs. CUR
PDEA
 2010 Observed statistics = 5518 P value =.042
CUR
PDEA
 2000 vs. CUR
PDEA
 2010 Observed statistics = 5198 P value =.055
Abbreviation: CUR, capacity utilization ratio.
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8% in 2010. However, the average scores of CURPDEA decreased 
from 0.87 to 0.82, yielding to excess capacity in PDH of 13% 
in 2000 and 18% in 2010. Given their fixed resources, PDHs 
capacity usage could be increased by around 13% in 2000 
and 18% in 2010 even under a budget constraint. PDHs had 
highest average CU in 2000 compared to 2010 meaning that 
the excess capacity of PDHs is less in 2000 than in 2010. The 
PDHs in 2010 are more likely operating farther from full plant 
capacity. 
Based on the standard DEA model, the CURSDEA for PDHs 
varies from 0.60 to 1 in 2000 and from 0.66 to 1 in 2010. 
CURPDEA varied from 0.22 to 1 in 2000 and from 0.41 to 1 in 
2010 and in average decreased by 5% when comparing 2010 
to 2000. It is clear that the CUR measured by dual DEA model 
is less than the standard one. This is not surprising because 
the dual model includes a larger set of restrictions on input 
and output variables. Thus, we can infer that our Dual DEA-
based shadow price results are quite robust. In the rest of the 
analysis, we focus on the trends in CURPDEA measures. 
It is very difficult to see whether the standard du dual DEA 
models have significant differences just by comparing some 
statistical descriptions. A parametric test would be based 
on the framework of Simar and Wilson32,33 that developed 
a statistical framework for DEA to estimate confidence 
intervals of efficiency scores. However, their method relies 
on a standard DEA output or input model for which the data 
generating process (DGP) can be rigorously formulated from 
a statistical point of view. In our case, we use a non-standard 
DEA model in the sense that the CU measure is a ratio of 
two efficiency measures and, in addition, we use a dual 
model including ordering on the shadow prices. Therefore, 
the framework of Simar and Wilson cannot be applied in our 
study. There is no statistical model in the literature available 
for CU measure. An alternative is to use nonparametric 
Wilcoxon test for unknown distribution and independent 
samples like the case of the distribution of CU scores. Thus, 
we used Wilcoxon to test the differences DEA models for 
2010. We find evidence of no significant differences between 
CU scores of 2010 between standard and dual DEA models 
(P = .042). The same test rejects the statistically significant 
differences of CU dual DEA models for the two study periods 
(P = .055).
Figure gives the frequency distribution of CURPDEA and 
classifies the hospitals by their CU scores. These results 
indicate that 76% of PDHs operate under their full plant 
capacity in 2010, whereas in 2000 only 73% of PDHs operate 
Figure. Frequency Distribution of Plant  Capacity Utilization (CU).
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in the same condition. Sixty-five percent of total PDHs use 
more than 80% of their capacity in 2010 whereas in 2000 they 
use only 72%. The standard deviation of CURPDEA is 0.15 and 
0.13, respectively, denoting a quite homogenous frequency 
distribution.
Table 3 presents the frequency distribution of the utilization of 
the variable input (operating budget) (VIU). VIU distribution 
is similar to that obtained for CURPDEA. The PDHs can be 
classified as follows: 
•	 Group I (73 PDH in 2000 vs. 65 in 2010) has a VIU <1 
meaning having an excess budget with respect to the 
optimal CU.
•	 Group II (7 PDH in 2000 vs. 5 in 2010), has a VIU = 1 
meaning optimal budget use. 
•	 Group III (21 PDH in 2000 vs. 24 in 2010), has a VIU>1 
meaning needing more budget.
Moreover, we establish a comparison between CUR and 
the classical BOR. Table 4 shows that both indicators are 
completely different and not correlated. On average, BOR 
shows that only 34% (2000) and 38% (2010) of beds are used 
while CUR shows, respectively, 87% and 82% of the plant 
capacity is used. The correlation-coefficient is barely 8% in 
2000 and 12% in 2010, meaning a full CU of hospitals does 
not imply efficiency in bed occupation. 
The BOR is measuring utilization of the available bed capacity 
expressed as a percentage of occupied beds in a defined 
period of time. BOR is an output indicator measuring a single 
dimension while CU includes the multiproduct nature of 
the hospital production. A low BOR can be due to limited 
staff numbers. A low CU can be improved by a more flexible 
budget to fully exploit the fixed inputs, in short term.
Table 3. Frequency Distribution of VIU 2000-2010
2000 2010
VIU <1 73 65
VIU = 1 7 5
VIU >1 21 24
Abbreviation: VIU, variable input.
Table 4. Correlation CUR and BOR, 2000 and 2010
 
2000 2010
CURPDEA BOR CURPDEA BOR
Average 0.87 (0.15) 0.34 (0.18) 0.82(0.13) 38 (0.20)
No. of PDH 101 94
Correlation 0.08 0.12
Abbreviations: CUR, capacity utilization ratio; BOR, bed occupancy rate.
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The national development policy framework in Tunisia 
is based on five-year plan that broadly comprises socio‐
economic areas. In order to, optimally manage the economic 
development across the region, policy-makers divided 
Tunisia in seven major economic regions and established 
three offices Regional Development in 1994. The purpose of 
these measures is to include gradually the trends in regional 
development policy into the five-year development plans. 
Then, we study the regional distribution of the PDHs. By 
region, PDHs may have different technical capacities, which 
can reflect differences in wealth of catchment areas. Table 
5 shows that PDHs in the great Tunis area have the highest 
average CU meaning they are near the full plant CU given 
their fixed inputs. On the opposite, PDHs located at the 
South Western region display the lower CU, meaning that 
they could increase their services by 23% in 2010 given the 
current fixed inputs and an unconstrained operating budget. 
By the Kruskal-Wallis test of the CURPDEA per region for the 
two years (Table 5), we can claim that CU of PDHs is not 
significantly different.
Discussion 
The present study evaluates the CU of PDH using the standard 
and the dual DEA models. The model that we developed is a 
dual form of the standard DEA where we integrate restrictions 
on shadow prices of outputs and inputs. The new version of 
the DEA model provides a better and more robust economic 
interpretation of the production frontier and in particular the 
nonparametric measure of the CU. 
The CU scores reported in this paper are based on hospital 
inputs and outputs data for 2000 and 2010. We found that CU 
scores have decreased from 2000 to 2010. Our results shown 
in Table 2 suggest that while it is effectively true that the 
hospital have become more equipped in 2010, their budget 
has not followed this tendency and, therefore, their CU 
was decreased. These results are in the same range as those 
obtained by Ferrier35 and Karagiannis36; 87% of US hospitals 
and 15% of Greek hospitals did not operate at full capacity, 
respectively. However, the Valdmanis37 study of plant capacity 
shows that public hospitals in Thailand are generally operating 
at relatively high capacity (90%–95%), given the levels of fixed 
inputs. We cannot compare these scores to our results, as they 
do not specify similar technology and dual DEA model with 
shadow prices restrictions.
The dual DEA models easily include multi-output and multi-
input factors of hospital production and measure CU more 
accurate than the often used BOR. We found a wide variation 
in the capacity DEA-based measure and BOR (0.34 versus 
0.87 in 2000 and 0.38 versus 0.82 in 2010). VIU information 
- defined as optimal use of the operating budget over actual 
usage - was used as a recommendation. A CU of 0.80 indicates 
that full capacity can be obtained if the operating budget is 
increased by a 20%. 
There is no correlation between CUR and BOR. Zere34 has 
found similar results and concludes that a CU-based DEA 
measure is more suitable for multiproduct hospitals. BOR 
is considered a doubtful and inappropriate indicator to 
evaluate the capacity of hospitals. The dual DEA-based CU 
method gives rich diagnostic information offering causes and 
recommendations on erasing excess capacity. The low rates 
(of CU and BOR) may imply that patients are not utilizing 
these hospitals and bypass their services to use second and 
third levels of public health facilities or to use private facilities. 
The poor quality, the lack of a diversification of specialized 
services as well as the lack of specialized physicians are part of 
the cause of the low CU. 
In the short term, the increase of the budget is a crucial solution 
for these hospitals and it can be increased by the SHI payments 
and/or the state subsidies. In fact, much has happened over the 
period in terms of health sector development and the reform 
of SHI. The new designed SHI, as purchaser of health services, 
has favored the coverage of healthcare services delivered at 
regional and university hospitals as well as private facilities, 
ignoring the PDHs and basic healthcare centers. It is crucial 
that SHI reinforces the PDHs supply to better satisfy the 
users and consequently reduces bypassing. Other solutions 
would be to reduce copayment for some services for patients 
and make some services such as child and motherhood care 
completely free of copayments in order to increase the use of 
PDH services. 
Our study lacked a complete overview of all information 
related to demand side (such as the perception of the lack 
of quality, unmet needs, and the level of OOP) or supply 
side factors (such as lack adequate specialized physicians, 
as well as equipment and other medical goods), as many of 
them are unmeasured. However, both demand and supply 
side are important. The influence of demand and supply 
side separately on CU is important and needs to be further 
investigated. A crucial question in this discussion is whether 
the hospitals could afford to provide expanded services and 
whether these could be provided with high quality. 
Epidemiological and demographic transitions as well as 
the intense use of technological improvements in referral 
hospitals (regional and university) have contributed to lower 
Table 5. Distribution of CURPDEA per Region
 
2000 2010
No. of PDH Mean No. of PDH Mean
Great Tunis 2 0.97 (0.03) 3 0.94 (0.01)
North East 12 0.91 (0.10) 9 0.87 (0.05)
Western North 18 0.85 (0.13) 18 0.80 (0.08)
Centre Western 24 0.89 (0.12) 20 0.84 (0.08)
Centre East 24 0.87 (0.16) 23 0.81 (0.11)
South East 9 0.93 (0.05) 10 0.86 (0.10)
South Western 12 0.80 (0.21) 11 0.77 (0.18)
P values Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of population of CU .833 .542
Abbreviations: CUR, capacity utilization ratio; CU, capacity utilization; PDH, Public district hospital.
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use of PDH. This transition in Tunisia is characterized by 
decreasing rates of infectious diseases and increasing rates of 
cardiovascular, respiratory, and neurodegenerative diseases. 
With such changing disease profile, PDHs as the first line of 
the public hospitals network, has not accordingly adapted. 
Chronic disease management indicates that high percentages 
of patients directly seek treatment in referral hospitals. The 
PDHs requirements for chronic disease treatment are likely 
to be low. Due to changes in medical technology and the 
sub-optimal responsiveness to community expectations, 
outpatient and inpatient services are done in second and third 
levels.
In Tunisia, all public hospitals fall under central level MoH 
management deciding on recruitment and allocation of 
resources. Current budget allocation seems insufficient 
to guarantee that all PDH are producing at full capacity. 
Expanding PDH budget is possible by increasing revenues 
(via household’s direct payments and/or the financial support 
of the social health insurance funds) or increasing state 
subsidies. Inflexibility in reallocation and historic budget 
policy are the key issue in solving this problem.
The analysis of CU per region highlights three points. First, 
the CU is reduced by more than 4% in Western North, Centre 
Western, Centre East and South East between 2000 and 2010. 
Second, Great Tunis always registered the highest average 
score of CU whatever the considered year. Compared to others 
regions, PDHs of Great Tunis has the lower unused capacity 
indicating that the volume of output can be increased by only 
3% in 2000 and 6% in 2010, with respectively, the actual fixed 
quantity of inputs and an unconstrained operating budget. 
Third, South Western is on the opposite, ranked among the 
regions recording the highest average unused capacity level 
(23% in 2010). CU variations between regions can be partly 
explained by ability to obtain direct household revenues. 
Increasing the operating budget seems a key solution 
for better utilization of fixed inputs. PDH able to attract 
additional finance are favored. From an equity point of view, 
state subsidies favoring Center and South Western regions 
can probably help CU increase. 
PDHs are unable to provide a complete needed treatment due 
to the lack of specialized physicians and medical equipment 
and technology. For example, women seeking safe, acceptable 
and good quality maternal and childbirth health services 
prefer the better-functioning and better equipped regional 
and university hospitals. PDHs are facing structural and 
managerial problems related to human resources (particularly 
the severe shortage of specialized physicians), machinery 
and operating rooms. They need to constitute an effective 
continuum of both preventive and curative services for most 
of the common diseases and to facilitate smoother functioning 
of primary healthcare centers. 
The majority of PDHs is facing limited resources in dealing 
with the unfavorable socio-economic circumstances and 
underserved catchment area. They do not provide the services 
requested. Improving the management of the PDHs requires 
the coordinated deployment of resources to better serve the 
population. Under the decentralization plan some PDHs have 
to be upgraded as regional hospitals to ensure an increased 
CU in the underserved area. 
Urgent steps need to be taken to enlarge the CU of PDH. 
Government should provide better working and living 
conditions in the peripheral areas to encourage physicians 
and other health personnel to work at PDH. In addition, SHI 
should turn as direct purchaser of curative care from the PDH 
as well as for a package of preventive services. 
Our results should be limited to the short term perspective 
regarding the composition of the fixed physical inputs. Our 
findings show convincingly that there is scope to employ 
CU-based DEA models to manage hospital networks and 
to reallocate resources at a strategic and operational level. 
The objective to address allocation decisions is met. For 
each specific PDH, the DEA model has identified CUs that 
could be used as comparators. The under-utilization capacity 
of PDH can learn from their fully CU peers by observing 
their production and management process. Reallocation 
of resources (state subsidies) can be done from higher to 
lower CU PDHs via the operating budget. By region, CUR 
variation reflects the differences in economic status of 
catchment areas of PDHs. Hence, reallocation of resources 
from more affluent areas where patients have a greater 
ability to pay for hospital services to poorer areas could 
be considered. 
Additionally, the unused capacity of individual PDH can 
lead to cost savings since our findings shows that additional 
operating budget (variable inputs) would be needed to increase 
the CUR for some hospitals but not for others; in the short-
run hospital planning. Furthermore, variation of personnel 
or beds in the medium and long term, respectively, could 
lead to others cost saving adjustments. More precisely, the 
CU based-DEA models can help decision-making in setting 
priorities and cost saving in terms of infrastructure or human 
resources and in hospital funding. Therefore, in-depth data 
and research is needed to reach more detailed hospital CUs 
geared towards a more complete set of managerial needs and 
perspectives and, thus to address allocation decisions. 
Limitation of the Study
The dual DEA model has its limitations. First, the DEA-based 
CU exhibits rich diagnostic information to determine causes 
of low CU and how to deal with it. We did not have complete 
and reliable data that could be used to unpack the influence 
of contextual factors on CU using a second-stage regression 
analysis. However, this study was a first pilot and dealing with 
the model only. The model needs to be reproduced and may 
be applied to other areas of healthcare provision to validate it.
Second, the study’ contribution could be improved if panel 
data for a sufficiently longer period are available to observe 
the changes in CU. The data used provide average rates of 
CUR for a specific year but the CU can vary a lot over the 
year. Furthermore, the data do not allow DRG or case-mix 
adjustments for inpatient admissions and outpatient visits. 
Consequently, different patient types are considered as equals 
in a productive sense.
Conclusion 
Our data analyses indicate that overall, PDH were under-
utilizing the production capacity for the two years of the 
study. The unused capacity (or excess capacity) is estimated to 
reach 5% in 2000 and 8% in 2010 when applying the standard 
DEA while it reaches 13% in 2000 and 18 % based on our dual 
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DEA model. 
The distribution of CU over the two periods shows a large 
increase of the proportion of unused capacity. In both years, 
PDH can increase their production by 20% or more given the 
fixed inputs and the unconstrained budget. Moreover, the 
data show that on average, the proportion of PDH unused 
capacity has increased in between the two years. 
The study presents a less gloomy picture of PDH CU compared 
to BOR. There is a need for new policy for PDH. PDH should 
operate efficiently at near full capacity level without facing the 
lack of sufficient budget and supply. Efforts should be made 
to enhance the productivity and healthcare quality as well as 
to reduce patients by-passing these hospitals. SHI can play a 
crucial role to promote the use of all PDH.
From a methodological point, this study has two main 
contributions. The first one is that the proposal of CU dual 
non-parametric model using directional output distance 
functions is to be preferred in performance measurement. The 
second one is that dual DEA with shadow prices restriction 
can be used for computing PDH. Our findings can serve 
as a resource for Tunisian hospitals planners to administer 
the CUR when addressing allocation decisions of currently 
available resources for capacity expansion. They may become 
aware of the advantages of using DEA methods as a measure 
of CU. 
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